Marty B. O’Malley
113 Sharon Drive
Pittsburgh PA 15221-4013
Phone 412-271-5459
Cell 412-979-6863
MSWORD:
VoteAlleghenyTestimonyAllCountyElectionsDeptDec042006
Dec
4, 2006 (updated, amended and revised to
reflect as presented that date)
PRESENTED
TO ALLEGHENY COUNTY ELECTIONS COMMITTEE
My
name is Marty B. O’Malley, 113 Sharon Drive, Forest Hills Borough, Allegheny
County PA 15221-4013. I am an elected council person in Forest Hills who first
became involved as a poll watcher in my race in the May 2005 primary. I caught
an experienced poll worker’s error of 80 votes short in my vote total, while we
were still using the lever machines. That shows we had election counting
problems even with the lever machines.
I
am a member of VOTE ALLEGHENY, an organization of volunteers dedicated to
advocating secure, accessible, recountable voting for all.
VOTE
ALLEGHENY submitted an after-action report on June 5, 2006 on the Allegheny
county May 2006 primary.
Did
the Election Board members read that report? (Note: No responses given.)
That
report emphasized major, serious problems with the ES&S machines
Specifically
with these 6 points:
1)
The zero count printout process failures,
2)
the paperless machine “trust argument” failures,
3)
the Allegheny county “culture of assurance” failures,
4)
the need for a citizen advisory council on electronic voting,
5)
the absence of routine electronic machine post-election audits including post
election code comparisons,
6.
The need for county legislation penalizing the use of uncertified voting
machine systems
Why
did VOTE ALLEGHENY make these recommendations in June 2006?
Because
Vote Allegheny documented that Allegheny County’s May 2006 primary used or
incorporated:
Uncertified
software
Uncertified
hardware
Dubious
or meaningless zero print-process reports.
All
of these shortcomings cast serious doubt on the integrity of the May 2006
elections.
On
Nov.12, 2006 VOTE ALLEGHENY reported on Allegheny County’s tests run on Oct 31,
2006 of ES&S M650 Logic and Accuracy Testing of the paper ballot
scanner/tabulator.
Did
the Election Board members read that report?
The
test involved a stack of paper ballots.
The
ES&S employee performed ALL the processes/procedures. The Allegheny County Elections Department
personnel stood and watched along with the other observers.
This
fact proves that we transferred operational control to a private corporation.
The
ballots ran through the scanner for tabulation and counting.
The
ESS&S employee then removed a ZIP disk from the ES&S M650 machine and
told us that the disk contained the tabulated and counted results from the
stack of paper ballots.
Then
we all marched down the hall to a separate room containing the UNITY machines which
translates the ZIP disk data into a paper print-out report. The ES&S employee
and Mr. Wolosik hand tallied the paper ballots to compare their hand count to
the UNITY machine printout.
The
observers discussed with the Allegheny County employees some serious concerns
about the security and electronic integrity of the tabulation and vote counting
system, including:
·
Portable computer loaded
with unauthorized software (PC Anywhere)
·
Portable computers
loaded with unauthorized wireless capabilities.
·
Portable computers
located in separate rooms networked together via Ethernet cables that violate
basic, standard security procedures, i.e. Cables running through blind ceilings
and walls.
Elections
Dept solutions offered was to hire a consulting firm that would certify or
“bless” the system as secure on the date inspected, without admitting that the
certification will NOT be valid the day after the test or the week after when
the election was held.
Today
I have but one question: does
Allegheny county election dept have written documentation explaining:
a)
Election procedures,
b)
Threats to the system and Defenses for the system?
If
NO, then why not have these procedures?
If
YES, then why is that information kept secret from the voting public which has
a right to know as specified in Pennsylvania voting laws and regulations.
This
election dept seems to confuse the GOOD concept of “Secret Ballot” with a BAD
concept of secret election policies and procedures.
The
natural fear of criticism seems to drive the elections dept policy to hiding
and withholding of public information about the election process.
You
seem to think that if you keep the process covert, no one can criticize the
process. When in fact the department’s covet actions drive honest people to
fear that the election process is flawed. That concludes my remarks.